Abdul Halim Khaddam between the failure of the authority and the absence of the opposition

publisher: ايلاف Elaph

AUTHOR: وائل السواح

Publishing date: 2006-01-05

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The easiest way to respond to the statements of former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam to the “Al-Arabiya” channel is to remind him of his role in issues that the Syrian public has been discussing for years, which has now begun to be addressed formally or semi-officially. However, the easiest path is not necessarily the best. We are not dealing with a small man like Hissam Hassam, whose story fades with time, and we are not dealing with a man who was a mere decoration in the Syrian regime, as many Syrian “leaders” were and still are. In reality, we are dealing with a man who played a role in shaping Syrian policy and the political structure over 35 years.

The other path may not be as easy, but it is the correct path to deal with the new situation brought about by Khaddam’s revelations. This path involves separating the man from the discourse. On the man’s level, everyone agrees that he was a full partner in responsibility and authority for over 30 years during the rule of the Ba’ath Party in Syria. However, delving into these details and neglecting the content of the discourse he presented in his provocative interview would be excessive.

The ideas Khaddam discussed in his talk can be divided into three parts: the domestic situation, the Lebanese situation and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and the Syrian-American relations file. It is the duty of both the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition spectrum to address the points raised by Khaddam in each of these parts

On the internal Syrian front, the major issues raised by the former vice president cannot be ignored. He linked the fundamental aspects of political, economic, and administrative reform, presenting a different and comprehensive vision for economic reform with a somewhat liberal approach. This includes political openness to the people and political opposition and, finally, administrative reform based on combating corruption and changing administrative structures. On the other hand, Khaddam presented a different conception of democracy compared to the Ba’ath Party’s vision, despite the recent developments within the party. He emphasized, contrary to the Ba’athist interpretation, that the people cannot progress if political action is restricted to a single party, which is incompatible with democracy.

Moreover, Khaddam, unlike most Ba’athist perspectives, did not divide the Syrian opposition into a nationalist and non-nationalist opposition. He did not distribute labels and ecclesiastical exclusions to some opposition groups, including “the Muslim Brotherhood.” He provided documents proving that in the last three years, he had been advocating for these ideas, including a book he wrote two years ago and a lecture he delivered in Qatar around that time, along with lectures in leadership meetings.

Once again, accusing Mr. Khaddam and his sons of financial improprieties is an easy response, but it is limited. The question is: Is there any truth in his accusations?

On the Lebanese front, it appears that Khaddam was indeed against extending President Emile Lahoud’s term and opposed the practices of Syrian officials in Lebanon. He seemed concerned about Prime Minister Hariri’s safety, even though he denied ever thinking that Syria could kill him. Again, one can recall Mr. Khaddam’s history in Lebanon, and he can be criticized even from his own words when he says he summoned President Omar Karami, asked for his opinion on forming a new government, and then imposed the appointment of Dr. Samir Geagea. Again, we say that this is not the crux of the matter. The crux of the matter is the discussion of his current ideas about extension, assassination, and the relationship between Syria and Lebanon.

In any case, matters seem clearer regarding Syrian-American relations, which the former vice president says were at their best in the 1990s after the correct stance taken by the Syrian leadership during the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the decision to participate in the Gulf War. The result was significant, balanced, and serious meetings between the late President Hafez al-Assad and Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. In comparison, we do not need much evidence to see the difference between that and the deterioration of current relations with the U.S. administration.

In these three issues, the Syrian authorities must provide clear answers if they want to refute the discourse and not just discredit its owner. For example, they could publish the minutes of leadership meetings to show that Khaddam is not telling the truth. They could also demonstrate his role in obstructing the reform process to counter his claim that he initiated reforms and others refused to listen to him. Moreover, they could prove that the individuals he alluded to without naming them do not actually possess the wealth he accused them of having. They could open corruption files to assure citizens that the government’s step is not merely a negative reaction but a serious proactive measure. If the official response is limited to a condemnation session in the People’s Council, a decision from the National Leadership to expel him from the party, and finally the government’s decision to investigate corruption files related to him, it may not only fail to convince anyone but could ultimately backfire on the government itself. The simplest question a Syrian citizen could ask is: If Khaddam had chosen to remain silent, would corruption files still have been investigated? This curious citizen might also inquire about how many corrupt figures still hold important positions or left power without facing criticism.

On the other hand, the opposition should take a position on this tragic event. As of now, groups like the “Damascus Declaration” have not decided on a stance on Khaddam’s statement. Individual positions expressed have been vague, mysterious, and not indicative of anything. For instance, what meaning can be derived from the statement of Mr. Hassan Abdel Azim, the official spokesperson of the “National Democratic Gathering,” who says that the “Damascus Declaration” is open to everyone? Is it an invitation, for example, for Mr. Khaddam to join his declaration?

The gentlemen in the “Damascus Declaration” present themselves as an alternative to the regime, which is their right without a doubt. However, this right imposes duties on them, the most important of which is answering every question posed by the new Syrian reality. It goes without saying that these answers should not be mere emotional reactions from one party or another but, as they should be, an analysis of the present and future, proposing solutions to problems, and specific action plans. It should not stop at the boundaries of slogans but move towards the boundaries of action.

Treating Khaddam’s statement as an ordinary event is a significant political disturbance that the current Syrian circumstances cannot overlook. The man presents himself as an alternative to the existing regime, similar to what Mr. Rifaat al-Assad attempted to do months ago when he declared that he would return to Syria to save it from its current situation. However, the difference between the two men lies in the fact that Rifaat al-Assad doesn’t believe himself when he claims to be a democratic savior, while Khaddam is a balanced man, a seasoned politician with a decent political reputation in Syrian public opinion. Some in the West seem to calculate such considerations. It is impossible to separate Khaddam’s presence in Paris from his opposition behavior and defection. However, what’s more important is that he did not present himself as opposing the structure of the regime but rather as someone modernizing from within this structure.

The tragedy is that Syrians cannot present a genuine democratic alternative to the current situation. The bets seem to revolve around “the Muslim Brotherhood” or authoritarian figures like Rifaat al-Assad and Khaddam. The authorities bear the greatest responsibility in this matter for forcibly excluding the Syrian street from politics and public affairs. However, the democratic opposition also bears a considerable responsibility due to its weakness, distance from the people, and lack of a clear and defined political program, leading it always to rely on the programs of others.

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