FROM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8827
SECRET
DAMASCUS 0’630’6
NODIS
FROM MURPHY FORS/SHILL ONLY
SUBJECT : FIRST MEETING WITH KHADDAM ON SOUTH LEBANON
DATE 27/09/1984
SUMMARY AND COMMENT: WE IN MEETING WITH KHADDAM SEPT 2 7 SPENT A FULL HOUR DISCUSSING SOUTH LEBANON . BRIEFED HIM ON GENERAL TENOR AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR MEETING IN ISRAEL , WHICH INCLUDED URGING THAT THE GOL CONTACT THE SYG ASAP FOR DISCUSSIONS OF NEW UNIFIL MANDATE AND ALSO START DIRECT MILITARY TALKS WITH IDF COUNTERPARTS. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT MY PRESENTATION. HIS FIRST WAS WHETHER THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT UNIFIL SHOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILL THE AREAS VACATED BY ISRAEL MEANS THAT THE LAF CANNOT ENTER INTO SUCH AREAS? I RESPONDED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING OF IN THE ISRAELI MOD IS THAT THE LAF IS NO WAY NEAR TO BEING ABLE TO MOVE AND THUS THE ISRAELIS HAVE GIVEN MORE ATTENTION TO UNIFIL. IF THE OUESTION IS WHETHER THE LAF CAN ” IN PRINCIPLE GO INTO AREAS UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY. THE ANSWER IS YES.
KHADDAM THEN MADE A STATEMENT WHICH HE SAID WAS REALLY A REQUEST FOR ELABORATION. HE SAID. “THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR DECISION THAT THE LAF CAN MOVE INTO ANY AREA OF LEBANON VACATED BY THE IDF.
I RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE A BASIC PROBLEM OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH CAN ONLY BE IMPROVED WHEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO MILITARIES SITDOWN AND DISCUSS MATTERS. AT THIS POINT KHADDAM HAD TO CUT SHORT OUR MEETING , AND WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 1700 LOCAL. I REPEATED TO KHADDAM THAT NEITHER THE SECRETARY NOR THE PRESIDENT HAVE DECIDED THAT USG SHOULD ENGAGE IN MEDIATION.
SUMMARY CONTINUED: WE BELIEVE KHADDAM MAY HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS , PERHAPS INCLUDING THE AREA OF UNIFIL OPERATION AND THE ROLE OF
LAHAD’S FORCES. WE EXPECT TO GET SOME TOUGH QUESTIONS THIS EVENING, INCLUDING A RENEWED SYRIAN INSISTENCE THAT LAF MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY TO ANY POINT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. I INTEND TO STICK AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO MY GENERAL PRESENTATION, SEEKING TO FOCUS SYRIAN ATTENTION ON THE URGENT NEED FOR LEBANON TO SEEK A UN MANDATE EXPANSION AND FOR THE LEBANESE MILITARY· TO ENTER DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ISRAELI MILITARY. IT APPEARS THAT THE SYRIANS WANT TO KEEP TALKING, BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE. END SUMMARY.
MURPHY, GLASPIE AND STAFF MEMBERS MET NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM MORNING OF SEPT 27. KHADDAM WAS JOINED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALNAIB, AN INTERPRETER AND A NOTETAKER. MATTERS CONCERNING TERRORISTS IN LEBANON AND BILL FOR A JERUSALEM EMBASSY REPORTED SEPTELS
IN ISRAEL I MET FIRST WITH DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN IN TEL AVIV AND PRIME MINISTER PERES. WITH RABIN. IN JERUSALEM. FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS, WHO IS NOW A MINISTER-WITHOUT-PORTFOLIO, SAT IN ON BOTH MEETINGS AS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (SHAMIR IN N. Y.). THUS, THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED REPRESENTED THE WHOLE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN JUST THE LABOR HALF OF THE COALITION. SENIOR PROFESSIONALS QF THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS WERE ALSO PRESENT. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN. I HAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE ISRAELI S HAVE ACHIEVED A CONSENSUS. HOWEVER DELICATE. ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IN LEBANON. AS WELL AS THE LIMITS ON HOW THEY GO ABOUT IT.
– I TOLD THE ISRAEL IS THAT I HAD MET IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESIDENT AND THAT IN EACH MEETING I HAD DESCRIBED A SET OF EIGHT AMERICAN IDEAS OR CONCEPTS WHICH I HAD WISHED TO EXPLORE WITH THE SYRIANS, WHICH I THEN SUMMARIZED FOR THEM. – SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE VICE PRESIDENT DID NOT REACT OFFICIALLY TO THE IDEAS. IN MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE STATED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO TOLD SYRIA OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U. S. PLAYING A ROLE IN OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE U.S. DOING SO IN RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE STATED THAT THE LAF AND UNIFIL SHOULD PROVIDE SECURITY IN SOUTH LEBANON . SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT I WOULD CONSTITUTE THE MOST THAT SHOULD OR MAY BE DONE.
THE PRESIDENT STATED HE PREFERRED NOT TO GO INTO FURTHER. DETAILED COMMENT. I DID, HOWEVER NOTE THAT THE PRESDENT SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT OPPOSE A MOVE TO ENLARGE THE UNIFIL MANDATE IF LEBANON REGARDED IT AS HELPFUL, THOUGH UNIFIL SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED ANY CLOSER TO THE SYRIAN BORDER THAN IT NOW WAS.
THE ISRAELIS WELCOMED AN AMERICAN ROLE IN DEALING WITH BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO LEAVE LEBANON AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE BUT TO DO SO ONLY IF THEY WERE CONFIDENT ISRAEL’S SECURITY WOULD NOT BE THREATENED AS A RESULT. THEY ALSO REMINDED ME THAT ISRAEL WILL EXERCISE ITS RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 52 OF THE U. N. CHARTER IF ISRAEL’S SECURITY IS THREATENED AGAIN. IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM, THE ISRAELIS ASKED US TO TALK TO THE LEBANESE ABOUT TWO POINTS WHICH THEY CONSIDER TO BE VERY IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO BEGIN A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A PROGRAM FOR FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, WHICH THEY AFFIRMED WOULD NOT BE LINKED TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.
FIRST, THEY WANT US TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO SEEK A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE. THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT THIS CHANGE SHOULD INCORPORATE THE PRINCIPLE THAT THOSE AREAS VACATED BY THE ISRAELI ARMY SHOULD BE FILLED BY UNIFIL . WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE U. N. WOULD BE BETTER PLACED TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES ON A NEW MANDATE ONCE THE GOL HAS TAKEN THE LEAD TO SEEK AN EXTENSION. WE WOULD NOT PLAN TO DISCUSS WITH THE LEBANESE THE DETAILS OF ANY PARTICULAR CHANGE IN THE MANDATE.
SECOND, THE ISRAELIS WANT THE LEBANESE TO AGREE TO DIRECT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY DISCUSSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE ALREADY, OF COURSE, URGED THE LEBANESE TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. IT HAS LONG BEEN AN AMERICAN POSITION TO ENCOURAGE DIRECT
TALKS. WHAT I CAN ADVISE TODAY IS THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE NOW AGREES THAT TALKS BE ON THE MILITARY LEVEL ALONE, THOUGH IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED WILL BE BINDING ON THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD INCLUDE CONSIDRATION OF THE R ROLIS AND AREAS. OF DEPLOYMENT FOR UNIFIL, LAF AND LOCAL FORCES. THIS AGAIN UNDERLINES THE NECESSITY FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY. IF ISRAEL AND LEBANON SHOULD AGREE ON AN EXTENDED UN MANDATE, THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN THE DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS OF OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF THE UNSYG AND THEN HIS TASK OF GETTING THE AGREEMENT OF TROOP CONTRIBUTOR NATIONS AND THE UNSC. ISRAEL’S WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM WOULD BE PHASED BUT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER.
– IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POINTS, ISRAEL WOULD EXPECT SYRIA TO PREVENT INFILTRATION OF ARMD ELEMENTS INTO SOUTH LEBANON FROM BEHIND OR AROUND SYRIAN MILITARY LINES, AND THAT SYRIAN FORCES SHOULD NOT MOVE FORWARD AS THE IDF WITHDRAWS.
IN CLOSING, I WOULD ONLY ADD THAT THE ISRAEL IS SAID THEY WERE INTERESTED IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PRAGMATICALLY AND WERE NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION. THEIR OVERRIDING CONCERN IS TO ATTAIN SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE IR NORTHERN BORDER AREA
AFTER DELIVERING ABOVE REPORT ON THE ISRAELI POSITIONS. I TOLD KHADDAM I WISHED TO MAKE ONE FURTHER PERSONAL COMMENT ABOUT THE ISRAELI OUTLOOK ON WITHDRAWAL. EMPHASIZING THAT I WAS NOT QUOTING ANY ONE ISRAELI OFFICIAL BUT READING BETWEEN THE LINES, I BELIEVED THERE WERE THREE POSSIBLE ISRAELI OPTIONS ON WITHDRAWAL:
(A) AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATED AND AGREED THROUGH DIRECT TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE MILITARY AND WITH UNIFIL INVOLVEMENT IN THE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
(B) AN INCOMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, LEAVING THE IDF IN THE BOQAA OR WHEREVER ELSE THEY MIGHT FIND THEIR SECURITY THREATENED.
(C) A RAPID, UNCOORDINATED WITHDRAWAL, FULL OR PARTIAL. SAID THIS RAISED TO ME THE NIGHTMARE OF A WITHDRAWAL LIKE SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE SHUF AND THREATENED WIDESPREAD BATTLES AMONG LEBANESE FACTIONS.
FOLLOWING THE ABOVE PRESENTATION, UNINTERRUPTED BY KHADDAM EXCEPT FOR TRANSLATIONS, I ASKED : WHETHER HE HAD QUASTIONS. HE SAID ,HE DID AND ASKED THE QUESTIONS REPORTED IN THE SUMMARY . AFTER AN AIDE BROUGHT HIM A NOTE HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CUT OUR MEETING SHORT . WHEN, HE ASKED, DID WE HAVE TO DEPART? I SAID WE COULD SPEND ANOTHER NIGHT IN DAMASCUS. KHADDAM SAID IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE A SECOND MEETING; HE WOULD HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS AND WANTED TO READ THE RECORD OF TH IS FIRST MEETING. (THIS, OF COURSE, WILL ALSO GIVE HIM TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH ASSAD . (WE SET A SECOND MEETING FOR
17,00 HOURS LOCAL. PLAN TO DEPART, TOMORROW MORNING FOR BEIRUT.)
WE WILL NEED THE VICE PRESIDENT’S HONEST OPINION THIS AFTERNOON AS TO WHAT I SHOULD RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT HE “CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. ”
GLASPIE