Former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam revealed in the latest episode of his memoirs the reasons behind the Arabs’ defeat against Israel in the 1967 war. He stated that they fought “the war without loyalty to the homeland and without proper military preparation.”
Khaddam shared in his memoirs, published by the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, that the June defeat “was not a fleeting event in the history of the region and its countries, particularly the Arab Mashreq countries. This defeat had a profound impact on the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much has been discussed about this war and its causes, with numerous questions and accusations raised. These questions include: How did Israel manage to succeed in a war against three Arab countries, namely Syria, Egypt, and Jordan?”
He continued, “Considering it my duty, and having closely followed these significant events since the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, I felt compelled to address this matter. I have identified the following reasons for this defeat. Firstly, the Arab countries failed to take the necessary measures to study the causes of the ‘Nakbah’ and the factors of weakness in the Arab position. The decision that was made was to sign the ‘Joint Arab Defense Agreement,’ which, although commendable in its content, remained stagnant as its institutions and mechanisms were not established, similar to what happened later with the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in Western countries and the Warsaw Pact in Eastern European countries.”
According to Khaddam, the second reason behind the defeat was “divisions within the Arab arena and the formation of two political blocs: the first included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, while the second included Iraq and Jordan. The situation worsened with Iraq’s participation in the ‘Central Alliance,’ which was formed alongside Iran, Turkey, and Iraq under the auspices and participation of Britain. The objective of forming the ‘Central Alliance’ was to prevent Soviet infiltration into Middle Eastern countries.”
Regarding the third reason, Khaddam wrote, “The bloc formed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria did not establish a defensive structure.”
Another significant reason, according to him, was Egypt and Syria’s “decision to shift the army’s loyalty from the homeland to the regime.” This decision resulted in the dismissal of numerous officers in both countries. In Syria, the “Baathists” made a grave mistake by transforming the “Baath” into an exclusive totalitarian party with absolute power and decision-making authority. As a result, “Nasserite” officers were dismissed, while a tripartite agreement was signed among Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. This agreement entailed a union between the three countries. The military committee, which took control of the armed forces, also expelled General Ziad Hariri and his colleagues from the Syrian army. Additionally, many officers who were not “Baathists” were discharged, being accused of being “reactionary.” Consequently, the army was depleted of competent officers on one hand, while conscripted officers in reserve were called up for military service, as they were deemed reliable due to their affiliation with the “Baathists.” Furthermore, the party leadership adopted a tough stance domestically and in foreign relations, particularly with Arab countries, resulting in their isolation. In these circumstances, the Israeli aggression against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan occurred on June 5, 1967.