Khaddam… the code of Assad’s rule

publisher: عكاظ okaz

AUTHOR: عبد الله الغضوي

Publishing date: 2020-04-10

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“Bashar al-Assad, a disturbed dictator… and the father, a rational dictator”

On March 31st of last year, Tuesday morning at 5:00 Paris time, the most prominent Syrian politician of decades, who witnessed Hafez al-Assad’s rule up close, passed away. The journey of Syrian Vice President Abdul-Halim Khaddam concluded at the age of 88, folding the recent history of one of the most important figures and policymakers in Syria. Assad, the father, aspired for Khaddam, a Sunni man from the coastal city of Banias, to be his right-hand political man, proving that his rule encompasses Syria’s diversity from a sectarian standpoint. Khaddam became “Abu Jamal” after a long journey in the rugged paths of the Ba’ath, serving as the “black box” for the elder Assad and the keeper of foreign policy secrets.

Khaddam, holding a law degree, held important positions in his political career, starting as the governor of Quneitra and Hama, then Minister of Trade and Economy. Finally, Assad chose him as the political face to represent foreign policy at the end of 1970, during one of the toughest phases for Syria under Hafez al-Assad’s rule. Abdul-Halim Khaddam had a new lease on life in 1977 when he survived a failed assassination attempt that claimed the life of Saif Saeed Ghobash, the first Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the UAE. Terrorists aimed to assassinate Khaddam, but the bullets deviated, settling in the body of the Emirati minister. After that incident, Khaddam became one of the closest to Hafez al-Assad and a keeper of his secrets. Assad felt that targeting Khaddam was an attack on his rule, bringing the two men closer together.

After the death of President Hafez al-Assad in June 2000, Khaddam no longer saw the importance of continuing in political work due to the purge campaign that targeted what came to be known as the “old guard.” Khaddam was among the prominent figures of this guard, and after five years of the shift in Syrian politics between the father and the son, and the prevalence of the phenomenon of eliminating the old guard, which extended to financial dimensions as well, Khaddam’s decision to leave the country was made. He announced that he had separated from the Assad regime and the ruling system, choosing the French capital as his final stop.

“The complete narrative has not been written yet.

Debate surrounds Khaddam and remains controversial. The Muslim Brotherhood considers him responsible for the 1982 Hama massacre, while the new opposition generation sees him as responsible for burying the opposition movement known as ‘Damascus Spring.’ At that time, Khaddam was present at Damascus University in February 2001, stating, ‘We do not want Syria to be a second Algeria.’ Subsequently, security forces launched a widespread arrest campaign against opposition figures, suppressing the opposition.

Regionally, the Lebanese view Khaddam as the one who strengthened Hariri’s influence through personal relationships and weakened Christian political currents. They consider him the worst architect of Syrian policy in Lebanon, responsible for unleashing security apparatuses in Lebanon.

The debate lingers over this man’s positions and what he accomplished over decades in Syria. Anyway, with Khaddam’s departure, part of Syria’s unwritten history goes with him, taking with it a precise and effective witness to Hafez al-Assad’s era, without Syrians receiving the full account of Assad’s rule.

5 Volumes and Communications with Khaddam

Two months before his departure, communications were held with the man, some of which are recounted here. These are documented contacts and notes recorded by ‘Okaz,’ as conveyed by the late deputy. According to what Khaddam told ‘Okaz,’ he completed five volumes that were written but not published or presented to a publishing house, despite futile attempts to publish. These volumes focus on Syria’s political history that he experienced until his departure from Damascus in 2005. These volumes contain a treasure trove of secrets about Hafez al-Assad’s rule, along with narratives that have not been mentioned yet, supported by private documents that Abu Jamal managed to take out of Syria.

It must be acknowledged that there is a significant loss with Khaddam’s departure. The loss is not in his person as much as it is a loss for one of the keys to the Syrian regime known by the man since the Ba’ath’s founding in 1963. Abu Jamal is a part, a partner, and a member of the joint-stock company of the Ba’ath, which still governs Syria. Syrians did not benefit from Khaddam’s history or his international and party political experience. Presumably, the Muslim Brotherhood played a significant role in distorting this man’s history, turning him into a Sunni ‘Rifat al-Assad’ after the alliance with him failed on the salvation front.

From the perspective of his contribution to building this regime and exiting it during the transition with Assad (the son), there must have been a role for him in dealing with this octopus from the outside. This is especially true after the Syrian revolution, considering the scale of the relationships he left behind in the army and some state institutions. However, the revolution’s paths retained some old resentments towards regime figures.

Khaddam, an expert in the Middle East’s composition through his work with the Syrian regime for decades, deserves credit for being the first to break away from the new guard after Bashar al-Assad took power in June 2000 following the death of Assad (the father). He expressed readiness for trial in Syria but not under Assad’s rule, as his trial would be under the gallows.

Khaddam cannot be blamed for his work with the Assad regime over the past years. He was the first man to teach Syrians how to say ‘no’ from within the system, as all Syrians were working not for the Syrian state but for Assad.”

“Why did he refuse to stay in Syria?

The events of the 2011 revolution are what led a large spectrum of Syrians to defect from the regime. Khaddam preceded them by six years, while being capable of retiring from politics and staying in Syria with rare financial privileges, alongside his sons who were part of the business class. Working with the Assad regime was not a charge from 1970 to 2011. However, the Syrian political populist discourse turned Khaddam into a corrupt figure, while corruption and subservience became a constant trait in the Syrian political personality. Some opposition figures topped the list of corrupt individuals, and this is not a secret.

The political maneuvering of many Syrian opposition figures was evident in their relationship with Khaddam and the revolution. The late Khaddam revealed numerous meetings with coalition leaders and opposition figures over the years, except for Burhan Ghalioun, who informed Khaddam of his unwillingness to meet. In one of his interviews with ‘Okaz,’ Ghalioun stated that Khaddam had ‘harmed the Syrian people,’ while many opposition leaders would meet Khaddam during the day and curse him at night.

What did he say about the Muslim Brotherhood, Bashar, and Iran?

In Khaddam’s recent conversations with ‘Okaz,’ he categorized the Syrian opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, Bashar, and Iran. Regarding the opposition, he consistently saw them as politically immature, claiming they did not know Syria beyond the map. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they were the worst party in the Syrian equation. He described them as ‘willing to work with the devil and obsessed with reaching power.’ They share responsibility with Assad for the situation in Syria. He considered Iran the greatest danger to the region. In his final advice, as he claimed, he warned Bashar after his father’s departure to ‘beware of Iran’s foxes.’ At that time, Bashar replied, ‘They are better for us than the fickle Arabs, and I know how to manage the country.’

Khaddam described Bashar al-Assad as someone his father Hafez never trusted. He revealed that Hafez despised Hamas and Khaled Meshaal, considering them hypocrites not to be trusted, but he used the movement as a regional card. Khaddam saw Iran as the biggest threat to the region. In his final advice, he claimed to have warned Bashar after his father’s departure to ‘beware of Iran’s foxes.’ At that time, Bashar replied, ‘They are better for us than the fickle Arabs, and I know how to manage the country.'”

“What is his opinion about Lebanese politicians?

Khaddam’s comments about Lebanese politicians were noteworthy, and we will faithfully convey what he said about them. He considered that the Lebanese political class changes its stance and opinion with just one phone call from Assad. Khaddam said, ‘There is no real Lebanese politician. They execute the agenda and requests of Assad. The only true Lebanese man was Kamal Jumblatt, who was assassinated by Syrian intelligence.’

He added: Lebanon will not reach a statehood stage because the politicians are not mature, and Iran is not ready to leave Lebanon. Every politician’s loyalty can be bought in the morning and changed in the evening. Assad once told Khaddam, ‘Nothing comes from Lebanon except a headache’ and ‘These people only understand force.’ Meaning, dealing with them is only possible through violence and coercion. What Khaddam wrote in his memoirs, which are still in his library in Paris, constitutes valuable knowledge for the history of Syria and the region. Certainly, Khaddam may not be entirely truthful in everything he narrates, like most politicians who write their memoirs. However, it remains a historical document that recounts the rise of Assad’s rule, his relationships internally and externally, and how Syria was governed over three decades.”

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