Khaddam’s memoirs…a message from Begin to Assad: We do not want to fight you in Lebanon…and the Palestinians must be removed from the borders

publisher: المجلة AL Majalla

AUTHOR: ابراهيم حميدي Ibrahim Hemeydi

Publishing date: 2024-10-22

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The Syrian President throws his forces into the fighting, and asks the Soviets for weapons... and the American envoy, Habib, demands that he withdraw and complains of “Israeli intransigence.”
المجلة

 

On the evening of June 6, 1982, the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement directed at Damascus, which was delivered via the Americans to Rafik Jouejati, Syria’s ambassador in Washington. The statement read: “The Cabinet has made the following decision: instructions are given to the Israeli Defense Forces to ensure that all civilian populations in Galilee are kept out of the range of fire from terrorists in Lebanon, where their bases and forces are concentrated.

The name of this operation is ‘Peace for Galilee,’ and during this operation, the Syrian army will not be attacked unless it attacks our forces. Israel continues to aspire to sign a peace treaty with an independent Lebanon, ensuring its territorial safety and security.”

In response, Damascus sent additional forces toward the battlefronts, deployed Syrian airpower into the conflict, and dispatched some special units, disguised as Palestinians, to Sidon to help defend the city. The Syrian army command also called for the mobilization of reserve soldiers. For Assad, it was essential to inform his ally, the Soviet Union, with whom Syria had signed a “Strategic Friendship Agreement.” Damascus communicated with its Soviet allies, stating that the Israeli military operation aimed to “eliminate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a key step toward liquidating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian revolutionary forces.”

On June 7, Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam summoned Soviet Ambassador Vicklis Fedorov. According to the meeting minutes, he conveyed the following:

“With reference to the ongoing cooperation between the two countries and the consultation and exchange of opinions, the Syrian leadership, after studying and analyzing the Israeli aggression on Lebanon, wishes to inform the Soviet leadership of the following: We believe that these wide-ranging acts of aggression were carried out in consultation and agreement between the United States, Israel, and certain parties in the region. The objectives of these operations are as follows:

  1. The elimination of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a fundamental step toward liquidating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian revolutionary forces.
  2. Forcing the Lebanese government into negotiations to reach peace with Israel, bringing Lebanon into the ‘Camp David’ framework, and removing Syria from Lebanon, along with neutralizing Lebanese national forces.
  3. Placing Syria in a dilemma, where it either remains silent and watches the Israeli acts of aggression, in which case it will be accused and isolated both regionally and internationally, or Israeli forces will strike Syria, and at that point, no voices will rise in its defense.”
أ ف ب
Photo dated July 21, 1982 of Israeli soldiers on alert in an armored vehicle in Beirut

The leadership in Syria has decided to provide as much support as possible to the Palestinian resistance and Lebanese national forces since the situation began to escalate, while trying to avoid direct confrontation, especially as we do not have a military presence in the southern region. However, with the advance of Israeli forces toward the areas where our forces are stationed, direct engagement has become inevitable, and indeed, our forces have clashed with the enemy forces on these fronts. Given this dangerous situation, the leadership in Syria requests that the friendly Soviet leadership expedite the delivery of the agreed-upon weapons, particularly those related to air defense and the air force, as the gaps in this area are significant and dangerous. We believe that Marshal Kutakhov and General Avtemov are fully aware of this matter.

Additionally, the armed forces are suffering from a severe shortage of ammunition, which is also a cause for concern. Therefore, the leadership in Syria urges the Soviet leadership to work on addressing the major shortage of ammunition.

4- The leadership in Syria also wishes to be informed of the Soviet leadership’s views on the ongoing and potential developments, and how to confront them.”

The Soviet ambassador promised to immediately relay the message to Moscow, which was still under the strain of the Soviet missile crisis that occurred a year earlier. At that time, Syria was in full control of the Beqaa Valley, where it had installed surface-to-air missiles since April 1981, following an attack by Israeli air forces on Syrian troops in Mount Sannine.

That summer, in 1981, the Israeli army shot down two Syrian helicopters in the Beqaa Valley that were on a mission in Zahle and Sannine, Lebanon. In response, Assad introduced Soviet-supplied SAM anti-aircraft missiles into the Beqaa Valley. Begin threatened Assad with removing these missiles by “special means” unless Damascus withdrew them, a demand that Assad refused. This crisis became known as the “Missile Crisis,” likened to the Cuban Missile Crisis between U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the early 1960s, which ended with Moscow withdrawing its missiles from Cuba.

There is no doubt that the coincidence of the Syrian missile crisis with the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor further complicated matters. It required regional and international interventions to reach understandings and overcome the “missile crisis.”

Some believe that this crisis was the beginning of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June of the following year. During the 1982 invasion, the U.S. conveyed “messages” to Assad from Tel Aviv, indicating that Israel did not want to fight the Syrians, provided that Syrian forces in Lebanon did not attack them. Tel Aviv assured, “There will be no action against them,” and asked President Hafez al-Assad to order the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters operating within Syrian forces in the Beqaa Valley to withdraw 25 kilometers north from the Israeli border. If the Syrian president accepted Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s proposals, the military phase of the Israeli operation in Lebanon would end, and a ceasefire could be implemented.

The United Nations Security Council had issued Resolutions 508 and 509 on June 5 and 6 to stop the fighting without conditions. Resolution 509 demanded that “Israel immediately withdraw all its military forces without condition to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon.” The PLO announced its acceptance of the resolution, but Israeli forces continued their military operations, leading to intense confrontations with Syrian forces in the Beqaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, and Beirut.

On June 8, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Nasser Qaddour received U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli, who said: “I have an urgent message from (U.S. envoy) Philip Habib, sent from Begin’s office. It is a message from Begin to President Assad, and it says the following:

1- Israel does not want to fight the Syrians.

2- If Syrian forces do not attack or attempt to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon, nothing will happen against Syrian forces.

3- Israel has noticed some movements by Syrian forces in lower Beqaa, several kilometers west and south of their positions as of June 5, and it requests that Syrian forces be withdrawn and returned to the positions they held on Saturday, June 5.

4- Israel requests that President Assad order the PLO forces operating within the Syrian forces in the Beqaa Valley to withdraw another 25 kilometers north from the Israeli border.

If President Assad accepts Begin’s proposals, the military phase of the Israeli operation in Lebanon will end, and a ceasefire can be implemented. Prime Minister Begin will not make any public statement or comment on this message.”

When Qaddour asked, “This is Begin’s position. What is your administration’s position?” the ambassador replied: “The instructions I received are to deliver the message for you to convey to the president, and Philip Habib is ready to come immediately if he is allowed to meet with the president.”

Damascus considered Begin’s message a threat and refused to respond to it. Qaddour told the U.S. envoy during their meeting in Damascus: “What kind of prime minister is this, who asks the U.S. president’s envoy to act as his messenger? The Israelis have no shame.”

Habib demands Assad withdraw to the “June 5 line.”

According to the official Syrian belief, U.S. policy during President Ronald Reagan’s administration was characterized by a confrontational spirit in international relations, but it sought to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also aimed to engage Assad and Arafat through Farouk Qaddoumi, the head of the political department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who received an invitation in mid-1982 to visit Washington from Congressmen Lee Hamilton and Paul Findley.

On June 9, 1982, President Reagan sent his envoy to the Middle East, Philip Habib, to Damascus to meet with the Syrian president. He stated that the U.S. administration did not agree with Israel’s decision to annex the Golan Heights “because it is unbalanced” and lacks convincing justifications. Habib said, “Our goal now is to achieve a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon while maintaining Lebanon’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. How do we move forward from where we are now to achieve that goal?”

Habib requested that Assad return Syrian forces to their previous positions to ensure a safe zone of about forty kilometers. This was complicated because among these forces located east of the Bekaa, in Hasbaya and Jezzine up to the Syrian border, there were Palestinian factions aligned with Syria and temporarily allied with Yasser Arafat in the face of the Israeli invasion. Assad replied that these Palestinian factions “are incapable of shelling,” but the Israelis claimed they could shell with 130 mm artillery and Katyusha rockets and that they had mixed with the Syrian forces to avoid being attacked by Israel.

The Americans reassured President Assad that Israel did not want a military confrontation with Syria and suggested the withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian forces from positions within the forty-kilometer range. Philip Habib said, “There is no objection to the presence of Syrian forces as deterrent forces in any of the locations they occupied before June 5. If that is achieved, Israel believes the military phase of its operation is over, and a ceasefire can be implemented throughout Lebanon.”

After some back and forth, Habib stated that Israel and the factions were withdrawing to the forty-kilometer area, while Syrian forces would remain in the positions they occupied as deterrents before June 5. Assad responded, “In Israel, they do not tell the truth, and the military operations are an expansionist invasion. They are the ones who started fighting against the Palestinians, the Lebanese, and the Syrian forces, not the other way around. When they say they are only targeting the artillery that hits the villages of the Galilee or even attacking the bases of the fedayeen, where does that talk fit with their assault on Syrian forces in the Bekaa? Where does that talk fit with their advance into Chouf and Mount Lebanon? As far as I know, there are absolutely no fedayeen in this area, and this area is also outside the forty kilometers. In light of these facts, how can we believe the Israelis’ statements?”

Habib replied, “It is true, they have exceeded the forty kilometers, which leads to escalation. We want de-escalation now, and I know that they have advanced, for example, in the western region and reached the Damour area, which is 80 kilometers away, and they are now trying to take the Damascus-Beirut road. This is the escalation, and we want to return them to their previous positions, then make arrangements for their complete withdrawal from Lebanon. Therefore, I say there should be a ceasefire, then withdrawal, and then final arrangements should be made. This is the sequence, provided that it is preceded by the issue of removing the Palestinian forces from their current positions.”

أ.ف.ب

 

Assad replied, “This is an aggression against us… this is an invasion of Lebanon and us. They have come to control the road between Damascus and Beirut, and this is something we cannot allow, even if we have to fight a hundred wars. We cannot allow them to cut off the road to Beirut, because we have forces in Beirut, Souf, and Bhamdoun. We did not act to escalate, and we did not initiate the clashes, nor do we have any desire to escalate. The Syrian forces want to restore security and calm to Lebanese territory because this is in the interest of Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinians, and everyone.

The Presence of Forces in Their Positions

Regarding the Syrian forces, Assad agreed to keep them in their positions. As for the Palestinian factions aligned with them in the Beqaa Valley, he stated, “This is not within our jurisdiction, nor our responsibility. We cannot discuss matters that are specific to them.” He added that this issue pertains to them and to Lebanese President Elias Sarkis. “What does it mean to ask Syria to remove a Palestinian base? No one believes that this request is due to the danger posed by the base; this is a fundamental political issue, and the intent is to dismantle the base and, consequently, impose Israel’s will upon us. This request is unreasonable, especially when it is directed at Syria.”

That evening, Assad met again with Philip Habib, who told him, “Prime Minister Begin has requested an immediate ceasefire starting at six o’clock tomorrow morning, Lebanon time.” Time passed, and the clock struck six; everyone agreed to the ceasefire except for Assad, who stipulated that it should include all of Lebanon, not just the Beqaa Valley. He said to Habib, “I agree to the ceasefire on the condition that withdrawal occurs in the first phase and is executed immediately with the ceasefire, because a ceasefire will not be practical unless it is accompanied by withdrawal.” The president continued, “I don’t want anything to remain unclear… What I understand from you is that the withdrawal will be from all Lebanese territories. True, we are not negotiating over Lebanese land; that is a matter for the Lebanese authority. But if Israel does not withdraw from all Lebanese territories, we will fight to defend Lebanese land, because we know, and we have experience with Israel.”

The president then asked, “If Israel does not withdraw, what will be the position of the United States?” Habib replied, “We are moving in that direction; the message states that Israel must withdraw.” The president said, “Then let’s summarize what you said as follows:

  1. The removal of Palestinians from the areas of Hasbaya and Jezzine, a distance of forty kilometers from the border.
  2. A ceasefire.
  3. Israel’s withdrawal to forty kilometers from its border.
  4. The Syrian forces will remain where they are as deterrent forces.
  5. Conduct negotiations and arrangements to establish a stable situation in the south, followed by a complete withdrawal of Israel.”

The president continued, “The fedayeen were committed to the ceasefire, but after being struck in Beirut and the south, they defended themselves. Their commitment to the ceasefire is based on the Arab decisions made at the Tunis summit (held in November 1979 after the first Israeli invasion). The Israelis must understand that they cannot impose anything against our interests, the interests of Lebanon, and the interests of the Palestinians. We cannot negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, nor on behalf of the Lebanese. You are asking us for things that are not within our jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction only concerns the Syrian forces, and asking Syria to remove a Palestinian base is a political matter that contradicts our principles and values. A ceasefire without withdrawal serves Israel’s interests, so I believe the ceasefire should be linked to an immediate withdrawal to specified points, after which a complete withdrawal should commence.”

Habib replied, “I will convey that to President Reagan and let you know the response.” At 11 PM on June 10, President Assad met with Philip Habib for the third time during his stay in Damascus. The latter appeared very dejected as he addressed his host, saying, “I requested this meeting to inform you about the communications we have had with the Israelis. Minister Haig called me and said he was going to Israel, but the Israeli obstinacy prevented him. Haig is upset with the Israeli position because they do not agree to a ceasefire without conditions. The withdrawal will not happen until they understand the new situation in Lebanon.”

The next morning, Israel announced a unilateral cessation of hostilities, provided that the other parties complied. The ceasefire lasted for a few hours before Israel resumed its operations in the Beirut and mountain regions, aiming to reach the Lebanese capital and eliminate the Palestinian presence there while cutting off the Beirut-Damascus road.

Indeed, as Assad had anticipated, Israel began its military campaign to control the Damascus–Beirut road on June 22. By June 24, it reached the town of Chtaura, where Syrian-Lebanese summits were held due to its location on the international road connecting the two capitals.

The siege of Beirut began on June 14 and continued until August, ending only with the withdrawal of 14,000 Palestinian fighters, who were dispersed to Syria, Jordan, and Yemen, while their leadership headed to Tunisia as guests of President Habib Bourguiba.

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