Damascus refuses to link the Syrian and Israeli withdrawal
After Yasser Arafat's departure from Lebanon in the summer of 1982, the United States maintained its military presence and provided significant support to President Amin Gemayel, who succeeded his brother, "Sheikh Bashir," after the latter was assassinated by a member of the "Syrian Social Nationalist Party" on September 14, 1982. The Reagan administration insisted on keeping its forces in Lebanon, stating that they would not withdraw unless requested by the Lebanese authorities. The U.S. justified its decision by citing the need to combat Soviet influence in the region and Iranian influence in southern Lebanon, which had begun to manifest clearly through armed militias that eventually gave rise to the Hezbollah organization in 1984.
“Operation Blue Bat”
This was not the first U.S. intervention in Lebanon. A similar military intervention occurred in 1958 at the request of then-President Camille Chamoun, who was aligned with the West and was facing a popular uprising against him, led by supporters of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser with backing from Syria’s “Second Bureau” (the Military Intelligence Division). President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration sent 14,000 U.S. troops to the Lebanese shores, most of them Marines, who arrived in Beirut on July 15, 1958, one day after the armed revolution in Iraq that overthrew King Faisal II, who, like Chamoun, was also aligned with the West and the United States. America’s goal in “Operation Blue Bat” was to protect Chamoun from a fate similar to that of the Iraqi king and to curb the influence of communism in the Middle East. The soldiers were instructed to secure Beirut International Airport and protect Chamoun from the pro-Nasserist popular unrest in Lebanon. U.S. forces withdrew on October 25, 1958, after ensuring the president’s security at the Baabda Palace until the very last minute of his constitutional term, when he was replaced by the strong general Fouad Chehab as President of Lebanon.
Many of the key players from the 1958 crisis were still active in Lebanon at the start of the 1980s, including Camille Chamoun himself, who was allied with the “Kataeb Party” and opposed to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Despite being in his eighties, he led a militia through his sons during the civil war. Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, leader of the “Kataeb Party,” was also still active, allied with Chamoun, just as he had been in 1958.
The opposing front, aligned with Syria, was represented in 1958 by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, Maronite leader Hamid Frangieh, and Sunni leader Saeb Salam. Jumblatt was assassinated in 1977 and succeeded by his son “Walid Bey,” who was allied with the Syrians in 1982 but later turned against them following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Hamid Frangieh withdrew from political life, and his brother, Suleiman, succeeded him in leading the Frangieh family in Zgharta and commanding the “Marada” militia before being elected President of Lebanon in 1970. His presidency saw the outbreak of the civil war in 1975.
Israel itself had not changed much between 1958 and 1982, nor had the United States, except in the identity of its enemy. In the 1950s, its goal was to limit communism, but by the 1980s, its foreign policy focused on combating “Khomeinism” and limiting the influence of the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” which came to power in 1979.
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel delivers a speech in front of the White House on December 1, 1983, and behind him appeared US President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.
The May 17 Agreement
With direct support and supervision from President Ronald Reagan’s administration, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel entered into direct negotiations with Israel at the end of 1982. These negotiations led to the signing of the May 17, 1983 Agreement, which aimed to end the state of war between the two countries and set a timeline for the withdrawal of the Israeli army within 8 to 12 weeks. The Lebanese Parliament convened to discuss and vote on the agreement, with the absence of 19 MPs aligned with Syria and opposed to Israel. Many Christian parliamentarians voted in favor of the May 17 Agreement, including Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel (the father of President Amin Gemayel). Notably, Shiite MP Abdel Latif Beydoun from Bint Jbeil also voted in favor. Former Prime Minister Rashid Solh abstained from voting, as did prominent Shiite MP Hussein Husseini, who later became Speaker of Parliament and one of the architects of the “Taif Agreement.”
The goal of the May 17 Agreement was to impose a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel, ultimately aimed at removing the justification for the continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon, in tandem with the withdrawal of Israeli forces, which had invaded Beirut in June 1982 and withdrew from the city on September 29 of the same year, following Arafat’s departure.
Before the start of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, U.S. envoy Philip Habib traveled to Damascus on October 23, 1982, hoping to persuade the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon. His visit was hastened by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s trip to Moscow earlier that month, during which he secured Soviet approval to deploy two air defense brigades (SAM-5) in Syria, significantly enhancing the Syrian army’s readiness to confront Israel in Lebanon.
At that time, Syria had a dominant presence in the Bekaa Valley and had installed surface-to-air missiles there since April 1981, following an intense Israeli air attack on Syrian forces in Mount Sannine. Assad refused to meet with Philip Habib, who instead met with Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam. Habib said: “The opportunity has come for us, you, and Israel to create an independent Lebanon. There is a government in Lebanon that wants to maintain the best relations with the Arab world and be sovereign in its own home.” Habib added, “This can only be achieved by the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.” Khaddam responded that the gap between the two countries remained wide, rejecting the link between Syrian and Israeli withdrawals.
Khaddam asked about the arrangements the U.S. administration was considering for Lebanon, and Habib replied: “A security zone, open borders, no heavy weapons in the security zone, and electronic monitoring stations within Lebanese territory.” He added that the Israelis were not in favor of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) troops and wanted a certain level of dialogue, with a meeting to be held with the Lebanese in Jerusalem. Habib said: “The Lebanese can speak for themselves so that the Israelis take them seriously.” Khaddam responded that Lebanese President Amin Gemayel did not represent all the Lebanese, to which Habib replied that he had the support of prominent Sunni Muslim figures like former Prime Minister Saeb Salam and influential Druze leader and former Defense Minister Prince Majid Arslan, clarifying: “President Gemayel knows how to protect Lebanon’s sovereignty and maintain its independence, and we will give him our support.” The Syrian side replied that Gemayel would not have garnered such broad political support had it not been for Syria’s intervention on his behalf after his brother’s assassination and the reconciliation facilitated by former President Suleiman Frangieh. The following dialogue then ensued:
Khaddam: Did the Israelis request any form of aerial or naval monitoring over Lebanon?
Habib: They requested the right to patrol Lebanese territorial waters. This is not a hostile action. We must be practical to reach security arrangements.
Khaddam: What about the withdrawal and the post-withdrawal phase?
Habib: At this stage, let’s note that there are no negotiations, but rather we are debating whether there could even be negotiations.
Khaddam: I am asking for the American position, not the Israeli one.
Habib: Regarding the withdrawal, I do not think it should be prolonged or take months. I’m not saying it should happen in ten days or two weeks, but it must be short and specific. It should not be piecemeal, like slicing a sausage into small pieces. You are now face to face with Israeli forces… from Sofar to the Bekaa… and I believe there is room for separation. This should be linked to a process that leads to full withdrawal, rather than each side remaining in place for months and months. The Lebanese cannot endure that.
President Hafez al-Assad (center) is applauded by his deputy Abdul Halim Khaddam (right) and Syrian representatives, on March 11, 1999 during the swearing-in ceremony for a fifth presidential term.
The Entry of Syrian Forces… and Assad’s Quagmire
The Americans’ rationale in the negotiations preceding the May 17 Agreement was the same one that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger used to invite the Syrian army to militarily intervene in Lebanon in 1976. The beginning of the Syrian intervention was twofold: through regular Syrian forces that entered Lebanon on May 30, 1976, and through the “Arab Deterrent Forces” established by the Riyadh Summit on October 17-18, 1976. The total number of deterrent forces reached 35,000 fighters, 30,000 of whom were Syrians, with the rest from various nationalities, including Libyan, Saudi, and Sudanese forces.
The Americans wanted the Syrian intervention at the time to bog down Hafez al-Assad in a long-term war that would distract him from fighting Israel. Kissinger justified his argument without explicitly stating it: “If you do not enter Lebanon, Israel will,” instead of saying, “If you enter Lebanon, Israel will certainly enter as well.”
After the Reagan administration presented its view on the necessity of a simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces, Philip Habib told Abdel Halim Khaddam that Washington wanted to build a “small, non-aggressive, effective, and non-offensive” Lebanese army.
Hezbollah Fighters… “Madmen, Not Mujahideen”
The conversation then shifted to the emergence of armed Iranian elements in the city of Baalbek, referring to Hezbollah, which Iran founded with Assad’s facilitation in June 1982. Habib said, “If they (the elements established by Iran in the Bekaa Valley in 1982) want war, let them go fight the Iraqis; there are 500 armed Iranians in Iraq.” He described the Iranian intervention in Lebanon as “madness.” He told Khaddam, “If you want to help the Lebanese, get them out. You are responsible for that region. This is complete madness… I don’t understand the point of their presence. I know you have influence in this matter. These people are madmen, not mujahideen. Don’t you agree with me on that?”
Khaddam was the first Syrian official to reach Tehran after the success of the “Islamic Revolution” in 1979, and the first Arab politician to meet Khomeini. He defended the Iranian presence in Lebanon, claiming it consisted only of volunteers with Lebanese organizations, no different from other Muslims who had taken up arms with Palestinian factions. The following exchange took place:
Khaddam: The Iranians are present with a Lebanese organization (Amal Movement).
Habib: How did the Iranians arrive?
Khaddam: From Beirut Airport.
Habib: Are you sure? Not through Damascus Airport?
Khaddam: No, some people came through the Damascus land route.
Habib: But some have arrived recently?
Khaddam: None of the recently arrived ones have entered Lebanon.
Habib: Is it possible that some of them slipped through from Zabadani (northwest of Damascus)?
Khaddam: The truth is that there are Iranians, but they’ve been there for a long time.
At this point, Minister Khaddam deflected the conversation from the Iranian presence in Lebanon to rumors circulating at the time that the U.S. was attempting to change the monarchical regime in Amman and bring in Yasser Arafat as a replacement for King Hussein, with the idea of making Jordan a homeland for the Palestinian people. Although Khaddam himself didn’t believe these rumors, he presented them seriously to steer the discussion away from the Iranian presence in southern Lebanon. Habib laughed and replied, “You know the answer very well… that’s complete nonsense. Arafat missed the boat on negotiations, and he missed the chance to participate in resolving the Palestinian issue rationally.”
Distortion of Assad’s Words
The meeting ended without any resolution: the American side remained firm on the necessity of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, while the Syrians insisted on their right to stay under the pretext of resisting the Israeli presence. On December 4, 1982, the Reagan administration stated that it “favors negotiations to create the necessary conditions for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.” Two weeks later, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Nasser Qaddour received the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Damascus, who informed him that a high-ranking Arab official had told Washington that Assad had contacted the leader of a Gulf state, saying: “If the United States gives assurances regarding the timing of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria will withdraw its forces simultaneously with the Israeli withdrawal.”
The American diplomat came to inquire about the accuracy of this information, to which Nasser Qaddour replied that he knew nothing about such a conversation. When President Assad was asked, he responded: “Indeed, there were contacts between me and Gulf leaders,” but a certain Arab official “took my words out of context.” According to Assad, what he actually said was: “If the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon would lead to Israel leaving Lebanon without attempting to impose any of its conditions, we are ready to withdraw from there along with the Israeli withdrawal, without linking the two.”