Khaddam’s memoirs: Israel besieges Beirut… and Arafat “went crazy” before he surrendered and left for Tunisia

publisher: المجلة AL Majalla

AUTHOR: ابراهيم حميدي Ibrahim Hemeydi

Publishing date: 2024-10-23

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
WhatsApp
The Lebanese Rescue Committee is divided... and Sheikh Bashir clings to the exit of Abu Ammar.
المجلة

The second invasion of Lebanon began on June 6, 1982, and by the 13th of the same month, the Israeli army managed to encircle the capital, Beirut. After solidifying their grip, the Israeli forces began military and economic pressure to force the city to surrender and raise the white flag.

The declared objective of the invasion was to expel the Palestinian fighters from Lebanon. From the very first day, Israel announced that it did not intend to fight either the Syrian army or the Lebanese state. The Syrians, however, had a completely different stance; despite the lack of warmth and trust between Yasser Arafat and President Hafez Assad, the Syrian forces were placed on full alert to confront the Israeli invasion.

غيتي

The commander of the “Deterrent Forces,” Brigadier General Sami Khateeb, contacted Brigadier General Muhammad Omar Halal, the commander of the Syrian forces in Beirut, and informed him that the Israeli army had entered the areas of Ain el-Rummaneh and Furn el-Shubbak and was on its way to the center of the capital. Khateeb asked him, “Will the Syrian forces fight?” Halal replied, “Yes… I will fight until the last man.”

Assad Refuses to Withdraw

In anticipation of the Israeli forces entering the Lebanese capital, the “Arab Deterrent Forces” began preparing to withdraw from western Beirut, where Arafat and the other Palestinian factions were based. The Lebanese state maintained neutrality, not firing a single bullet against Israel nor issuing any statement condemning or threatening it. Israeli General Yosef Hanan sent a message in French to Sami Khateeb, stating that he was ready to give the Syrian forces “one last opportunity for an honorable withdrawal” from Beirut and the Jamhour area in Baabda and the city of Aley. He set a deadline for the Syrians to respond, ending on June 15, 1982. Should there be no response or a negative reply, Israel would consider the Syrians responsible for the casualties and destruction that would occur in these areas.

Syria responded to Israel through Sami Khateeb as well: “We are present in Beirut by an Arab decision and with the approval of the legitimate Lebanese authority. Lebanon is an Arab and independent state, and we will defend Lebanon and its legitimacy and the Palestinian people with all our resources.” At 10 PM on June 15, 1982, Lebanese President Elias Sarkis informed the Syrian leadership that he would order his army to enter Beirut, which would entail the withdrawal of all forces inside the capital to other centers, including, of course, the Syrian forces.

Sarkis’s Position

Assad communicated with his Lebanese counterpart, stating that he had no objections to the Lebanese army asserting control over all of Lebanon, but that this was impossible today due to the Israeli occupation. Assad added that the simultaneous withdrawal of the “Deterrent Forces” and the Syrian army from Beirut was extremely dangerous, as it would simply mean the surrender of Beirut and handing it over on a silver platter to Ariel Sharon. Sarkis agreed to postpone the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and formed a “National Salvation Committee” under his leadership, which included former Prime Minister Saeb Salam (representing Sunni Muslims), the leader of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri (representing Shia Muslims), the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt (representing the Druze community), the leader of the Phalange Party, Bashir Gemayel (representing the Maronite Christians), along with Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros (a Catholic Christian).

غيتي

 

Disagreements within the “Salvation Committee”

These members were not in political agreement but accepted to join the committee and met at the request of President Sarkis, with the presence of Prime Minister Chafik Wazzan on June 20, 1982, affirming the necessity of the Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory. Bashir Gemayel opposed the clause concerning the “protection of the Palestinian resistance” and stood against what Berri and Jumblatt demanded: “emphasizing the Syrian political and military presence in Lebanon.” The viewpoint of the Lebanese authority, represented by Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros and President Sarkis, was as follows:

  • The entry of the Lebanese army into West Beirut.
  • The handover of heavy Palestinian weaponry in Beirut to the Lebanese army, while restricting light weapons to Palestinian camps.

Sarkis believed that Palestinians could remain in Lebanon with American guarantees, but under the sovereignty of the legitimate Lebanese authority. They would be entitled to engage in political and media activities without carrying arms or launching any operations against Israel from within Lebanese borders.

Two committees emerged from the “National Salvation Committee”: the first supported the Palestinian presence and consisted of President Chafik Wazzan, Nabih Berri, and Walid Jumblatt; the second opposed it and called for a solution through the American envoy Philip Habib. The second committee included Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros and MP Nasri Maalouf and was chaired by Sheikh Bashir Gemayel.

The “Palestine Liberation Organization” showed flexibility.

Both committees stressed the necessity of preventing an invasion of Beirut and requested that Israel withdraw 5 kilometers from the capital. The members of the “Salvation Committee” agreed that the “Arab Deterrent Forces” were legitimate forces present on Lebanese territory with the approval of the legitimate authority, and their mission could only be concluded with the consent of the Lebanese authority and the Arab summit together.

The “Palestine Liberation Organization” informed the “Salvation Committee” that it accepted to withdraw to the camps in exchange for a similar Israeli withdrawal, provided that the siege of the city of Beirut be lifted to a distance equal to that which the resistance would retreat to the camps. Yasser Arafat accepted that the Lebanese army would take charge of the separation and positioning in the areas to be vacated, in exchange for a guarantee that the Israelis would not enter. If these two conditions were fulfilled, the resistance would present its proposal to the authority on the basis that the Palestinian presence would be political and media-oriented, similar to that in other Arab countries, taking into consideration the “Lebanese specificity.”

أ.ف.ب

From left, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, head of the Shiite Amal Movement Nabih Berri, and head of the Communist Action Organization Mohsen Ibrahim during a meeting in Beirut, August 30, 1982.


On June 23, a Response to Arafat’s Initiative

On June 23, the response to Arafat’s initiative came from the Reagan administration, which rejected the continued Palestinian military presence in Lebanon and called for the Lebanese state to exert control over all Palestinian camps. Arafat was furious and requested a meeting with the members of the “Salvation Committee” present in West Beirut: Chafik Wazzan, Nabih Berri, and Walid Jumblatt, to present the following proposal:

  1. A comprehensive ceasefire and the establishment of a separation of forces around Beirut.
  2. An Israeli withdrawal of a few kilometers in exchange for the Palestinian resistance’s withdrawal with its weapons to the camps.
  3. The Lebanese army would take on the task of separating the forces and enter West Beirut, along with a request for an international force alongside it to ensure the ceasefire and implement the separation of forces.
  4. Opening free negotiations between the Lebanese authority and the “Palestine Liberation Organization” to determine the future of the Palestinian presence politically, militarily, and socially within the framework of full Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.

Freezing Jumblatt’s and Berri’s Membership and Wazzan’s Resignation

The “Kataeb Party” rejected this proposal, and Bashir Gemayel insisted on complete and unconditional surrender by the Palestinians, including the handover of their weapons to the state and denying them any privileges or immunity in Lebanon. Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri were angered by Sheikh Bashir’s stance and announced their decision to freeze their membership in the “Salvation Committee,” along with a demand for six ministers from their parties to resign from Chafik Wazzan’s government, noting that Wazzan’s position was moderate and opposed to the Israeli invasion.

When Wazzan found himself facing a request to sign the complete surrender of the Palestinians, he submitted his resignation to the President, which put Elias Sarkis in a very awkward position.

Choosing a Sunni replacement who would agree to sign the document of Palestinian surrender was not easy. Following the announcement of Wazzan’s resignation (which would not take effect for several months), there was intense shelling in West Beirut. On June 26, an attempt was made to hold a national Islamic conference to find a way out of the ministerial crisis, which Saeb Salam worked to disrupt as the sole Sunni leader in Lebanon. President Sarkis attempted to convince Wazzan to withdraw his resignation, and Walid Jumblatt announced that he refused to play the role of “conveying the American-Lebanese surrender terms” to the “Palestinian resistance,” and he would not agree to be “a witness to the conspiracy to slaughter the Palestinian people.” Jumblatt reiterated that he would not fire “the mercy bullet at the Palestinian revolution.”

French Initiative

French President François Mitterrand proposed an initiative to save Beirut under the slogan of neutralizing it for the purpose of separating forces with international guarantees. France offered to mediate in negotiations between the Lebanese authorities and the “PLO,” and Mitterrand’s initiative called for the implementation of resolutions regarding the complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, which encountered a veto from the U.S. administration.

Damascus contacted President Wazzan, who stated: “The Palestinians are convinced that they cannot continue in their previous situation in Lebanon. There is no specific or cohesive position; they are stalling to buy time and conducting their Arab and international communications. In my estimation, recent developments have been in their favor, from my resignation to the withdrawal of the members of the Salvation Committee.” Regarding Sarkis’s position, Wazzan said, “I do not accuse Sarkis of treason, but regardless of him being the president of the republic, he represents one group of Lebanese, and I represent another group, and each of us has his own approach.”

In a call from Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam to Nabih Berri, Berri said: “Morale is not high, and the number of fighters is rapidly declining. The ability to continue is weak due to the destruction of the basic military infrastructure of deterrence. There is a vast gap between the enemy’s combat capabilities and all of ours. We will fight with what remains of human resources and weapons until victory or martyrdom.”

Habib’s Initiative

On June 30, Philip Habib presented a series of points for the political solution concerning the city of Beirut:

  1. The leadership of the Palestinian resistance, along with its fighters, would exit the city of Beirut with their personal weapons, choosing the route and destination they preferred.
  2. All non-Lebanese armed individuals would be withdrawn from Beirut, including the Arab Deterrent Forces.
  3. Lebanese fighters in the western region would be disarmed.
  4. The Lebanese army would enter West Beirut and the southern suburbs to take over security responsibilities there.
  5. The future of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon would be discussed politically and militarily with the Lebanese authority.

Regarding the first point, there was an unannounced agreement from the leadership of Fatah for the Palestinian resistance leadership to leave the city of Beirut, while the withdrawal of the Arab Deterrent Forces required an Arab decision. On July 1, Sami Khateeb sent a message to Abdel Halim Khaddam informing him that Arafat and his companions would accept Philip Habib’s initiative to prevent the Israelis from invading and destroying Beirut. He discussed a series of complications, including the symbolic military presence of the Palestinian leadership in Lebanon, which Habib rejected based on Israeli insistence.

The second complication was the proposal for the Lebanese army to enter and deploy in Beirut, as Arafat wanted tangible guarantees for the Palestinians remaining in the capital, ensuring they would not face persecution from the “Kataeb Party.” The Kataeb’s control of some strategic areas did not encourage Arafat to surrender without such guarantees, making it clear that the idea of resorting to international forces became very urgent, though it required an official request from the Lebanese government, either before or during the Palestinian withdrawal. The third complication involved collecting weapons from West Beirut, which both Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt insisted should occur simultaneously with disarming East Beirut.

In the first week of July, President Sarkis fell ill, confining him to bed for several days. During the vacancy of the prime minister’s position, chaos prevailed in the Lebanese government corridors. Israel took advantage of this situation, imposing a cordon around Sami Khateeb’s house in the Hazmieh area to prevent him from communicating with the Syrians. In return, Damascus’s initial response was to refuse to receive the Palestinian fighters exiting Lebanon, as reported by the official “SANA” news agency on July 9, 1982.

Israel was preoccupied with its efforts to position its ally Bashir Gemayel as the next Lebanese president, succeeding Elias Sarkis. Gemayel sent a delegation to Damascus to seek support from the Syrians, despite the blood feud between them. The “Kataeb” delegation consisted of George Saadeh, Karim Bakardoni, and Joseph Abu Khalil, who offered a long-term truce to Syria. However, Assad stated that he would not accept Gemayel as president unless he took a clear stance against the Israeli occupation and participated in resisting it. Gemayel attempted again through Sami Khateeb, emphasizing the necessity of conveying his urgent message to Assad about maintaining relations with Damascus. He asserted his belief that Syria’s role should remain fraternal with Lebanon, based on the realities of geography, history, and the shared interests of both countries.

Arafat Maneuvers Against Assad

On August 7, Arafat sent Assad a surprising telegram, thanking him for Syria’s acceptance to host 1,200 Palestinians, something Assad had neither accepted in private nor public.

“Mr. President Hafez Assad, as you are aware, we have had intensive discussions with the Lebanese government regarding the withdrawal of the Palestinian forces present in Beirut, as this is a primary demand for reaching any agreement with us. We were informed during these discussions, and also after a meeting of my brothers in the Palestinian leadership with Your Excellency, that Syria has agreed to receive 1,200 fighters, in addition to the leadership and their offices. In light of these grave circumstances, I hope that, should a final agreement be reached with the Lebanese authority, Your Excellency will cooperate with our brothers in Syria in this regard, allowing us to resolve the issue of distributing our forces agreed to leave Beirut, hoping that our sister Syria can accommodate those who cannot head to another country, even temporarily, until their locations are secured. We are confident that the national ties between the Palestinian revolution and sister Syria will enable us to face this circumstance with a united position and shared responsibility. I sincerely thank Your Excellency for this fraternal stance we have always trusted from brother President Hafez Assad and sister Syria since the start of our revolution.”

This telegram marked the first communication between Assad and Arafat in months. Assad was surprised by its content, viewing it as an attempt by the Palestinian leader to twist Syria’s arm and embarrass it. Syria clarified its position to its Palestinian allies, such as George Habash and Naif Hawatmeh, stating that the fighters should remain where they are in facing Israel, denying all that was mentioned in Arafat’s message. However, they questioned: What is the number of fighters that will leave Beirut? What is the number of those who have no other destinations, and what are the nationalities of these fighters? While rejecting the content of Arafat’s message, the Syrian leadership kept the door open to discussing the possibility of receiving the Palestinian fighters, provided there would be no military operations from Syria and no training camps established without the consent and knowledge of the Syrian leadership.

Days later, Assad decided to respond to the Palestinian request in a way that would please the Americans and the French, while cutting off the path to further Israeli incursions into Lebanon. Overnight, the language of the Syrian official media changed, with government newspapers welcoming the transfer of Palestinians to Syria, stating that they would find there, “as they did in the past, refuge and support.”

Assad summoned the leaders of the Palestinian factions in Damascus and informed them of the decision and its conditions, emphasizing the need for discipline: “I am not President Sarkis, nor King Hussein,” referencing Arafat’s intervention in Jordanian affairs and the events of “Black September” in 1970, and his subsequent involvement in Lebanon.

Arafat welcomed the Syrian president’s decision, and on August 11, he sent a second message to Assad: “I and my brothers have received your decision and that of the regional leadership regarding the transfer of all your brothers, the fighters in besieged Beirut, who wish to go to Damascus, with great appreciation and satisfaction, especially given the special relations between the Palestinian revolution and Syria, particularly in these critical and difficult circumstances facing this Israeli aggression, which is supported by unlimited backing from the United States, providing it with the means of its might and strength of its aggression, and protecting and covering it. I, Mr. President, write to you from besieged Beirut, steadfast under the rain of shells from land, air, and sea, day and night. I urge you, Mr. President, to exert your efforts with your Arab leader brothers to unite this nation’s affairs in the face of this imminent danger from all sides. I thank you on my behalf, on behalf of my brothers the fighters, on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and on behalf of the Palestinian people for this kind gesture that we have come to expect from you and sister Syria. And it is a revolution until victory.”

غيتي
Yasser Arafat walking, and to his left, Palestinian leader Saad Sayel walking with Palestinian fighters in Beirut, June 26, 1982.

Withdrawal Program

A specific program was established to secure the departure of Palestinian fighters from Lebanon, with a timeline ranging from 15 days to a month at most. It was decided that the Palestinians would hand over to the Israelis, prior to their departure, through the International Red Cross, all prisoners in their custody, along with complete information about the prisoners who died in Palestinian detention. Below is the text of the statement issued by the U.S. State Department regarding the plan for the “Palestine Liberation Organization’s” departure from Lebanon:

  1. The leadership, offices, and fighters of the “Palestine Liberation Organization” will leave Lebanon for locations in other countries that have been arranged in advance, according to the schedules and arrangements outlined in the plan. The main objective of this plan aligns with the Lebanese government’s goal that all foreign military forces withdraw from Lebanon.
  2. All parties in Lebanon will fully respect a ceasefire.
  3. A group of United Nations observers will operate in that area.
  4. The military forces present in Lebanon, whether Lebanese, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, or others, will not intervene in any way in the safe and guaranteed departure of the “Palestine Liberation Organization” leadership, offices, and fighters at the designated time. Additionally, non-combatant Palestinians who comply with the law and remain in Beirut, including the families of those who will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations, will also be protected. The governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide adequate safety guarantees as follows:A. The Lebanese government provides its guarantees based on assurances obtained from the armed groups that are in contact with it.B. The United States provides its guarantees based on assurances obtained from the Israeli government and the leadership of certain Lebanese factions that are in contact with it.

    C. The day of departure is the day when the advanced elements (the initial forces of the multinational force in the Beirut area) are deployed according to arrangements made in advance among all concerned parties, and it is the day when the initial group or groups of “Palestine Liberation Organization” elements will begin to leave Beirut according to the specified schedule (attached).

    D. A temporary multinational force will be formed from units from France, Italy, and the United States, at the request of the Lebanese government, to assist the Lebanese armed forces in fulfilling their responsibilities in this process, ensuring the departure of the leadership, offices, and fighters of the “Palestine Liberation Organization” from any organization in Beirut in a manner that guarantees:

    • The safety of the “Palestine Liberation Organization” personnel who will be departing.
    • The safety of other individuals in the Beirut area.
    • The reinforcement of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government over the Beirut area.

 

The U.S. State Department report stated that the Lebanese army should contribute to the exit of the Palestinians with 7 to 8 military battalions, each consisting of 2,500 to 3,500 men, in cooperation with the Lebanese internal security forces. The International Red Cross Committee was to provide assistance to the Lebanese government in various ways, including organizing and managing the evacuation of wounded and sick Syrian and Palestinian personnel. The Lebanese army would serve as the main point of contact with the “Palestine Liberation Organization,” and the withdrawal should occur during the day, not at night, while the convoys move by land from Beirut to Syria without stopping along the way. The Israeli army was required to clear the route during the temporary period when the convoy passed, to avoid any clashes.

The U.S. administration allowed “Palestine Liberation Organization” personnel to carry personal weapons during their departure (pistol, rifle, or submachine gun, along with ammunition). They were required to hand over heavy weapons to the Lebanese army as “gifts.” The Lebanese army had the right to enlist personnel from the multinational force to carry out the process of receiving weapons and military equipment. Additionally, the “Palestine Liberation Organization” was to provide complete and detailed information regarding the location and status of remaining military equipment and mines before their departure.

The departure of the first group of Palestinian fighters was scheduled for 5 a.m. on August 21, 1982, from the port of Beirut. This first group consisted of the wounded and sick, heading to Jordan and Iraq. The following day, the second group would sail to Tunisia, and then on August 24 to South Yemen, and on the 25th to North Yemen. The group heading to Syria would begin departing by land on August 21, with gradual departures continuing until the 28th of the same month, and the exit process was to be completed by September 4, 1982.

The siege of Beirut began on June 14 and lasted until August, concluding only with the withdrawal of 14,000 Palestinian fighters, who were distributed among Syria, Jordan, and Yemen, while their leadership headed to Tunisia as guests of President Habib Bourguiba. On September 29, 1982, Israel ended its presence in the Lebanese capital, which was marred by the Sabra and Shatila massacre and the assassination of President Bashir Gemayel on the 14th of the same month. International radio stations paid little attention to this news, as they were occupied with the death of Princess Grace of Monaco and Hollywood starlet Grace Kelly, who died in a tragic accident on September 14, 1982.

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
WhatsApp

Recent Articles


Khaddam’s memoirs… “letters of love and threats” between Reagan and Assad… America withdraws from Lebanon, Israel retreats, and Syria “is isolated”

2024-10-28

Damascus releases the American pilot amidst shuttle tours of White House envoy Rumsfeld…and Washington foils a secret visit by Hikmat Al-Shihabi In the midst of the U.S.-Syrian military exchanges in Lebanon, President Hafez al-Assad’s illness, Colonel Rifaat’s ambitions for power, and the intensifying Iran-Iraq war, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam met with U.S. Ambassador […]

Khaddam’s memoirs…an American-Syrian clash in Lebanon…and Reagan’s envoy requests a meeting with Rifaat al-Assad after “Mr. President” fell ill

2024-10-27

Khaddam threatens Washington’s ambassador with “immediate expulsion”… and exchange of Syrian-American bombing President Ronald Reagan attempted to contain the crisis with President Hafez al-Assad following the bombing of the “Marines” and the shelling, sending his special envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to Damascus on November 20, 1983. Rumsfeld, a former Secretary of Defense under President Gerald Ford, […]

Khaddam’s memoirs…the Marine bombing before the Lebanese Geneva dialogue…and America accuses Iran of working “behind the lines” of Syria

2024-10-26

Washington accuses Tehran of being behind the Beirut attacks and criticizes Damascus for “facilitating the Iranian role” Robert McFarlane, Deputy National Security Advisor in the United States, returned to Damascus on September 7, reiterating previous statements about the necessity of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon to coincide with the Israeli withdrawal. On the 22nd of […]