Washington Accuses Tehran of Being Behind the Beirut Attacks and Criticizes Damascus for “Facilitating the Iranian Role”
Robert McFarlane, Deputy National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, returned to Damascus on September 7, repeating what had been said previously about the need for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon to take place simultaneously with the Israeli withdrawal. On September 22, he came to Syria again and said that the Reagan administration “understands and accepts” Syria’s interests in Lebanon, from both historical and logistical perspectives, and that it “accepts Syria’s legitimacy in Lebanon.”
The U.S. administration asked Syria, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, to convene a Lebanese dialogue conference in Geneva, Switzerland, attended by Abdul Halim Khaddam and all the Lebanese factions, who had not sat together at one table since the outbreak of the civil conflict in their country in 1975.
The administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan wanted to involve Syria in the Lebanese political process, while immersing it in the details and responsibilities of the process, in the hope that this would, in the foreseeable future, help persuade Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to withdraw his military forces from Lebanon while retaining political influence.
Riyadh brought non-combatant figures to the dialogue table whom it trusted and whose political positions it considered sound, such as Saeb Salam, Raymond Eddé, and Adel Osseiran. Washington, meanwhile, supported President Amin Gemayel, while Damascus remained committed to its traditional allies, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri.
Syria agreed that Gemayel should preside over the national dialogue, given that he was the president of the republic and descended from a prominent political Maronite family. However, it rejected the idea of having him sit at the head of the dialogue table. Instead, the participants were seated face-to-face: one side representing the United States, and the other representing Syria and Saudi Arabia. When asked why the seating had been arranged this way, Khaddam said: “We don’t like the round shape because it is not a beautiful shape. We prefer a rectangular shape.”
Nevertheless, Khaddam wanted to win Gemayel over to his side, hoping he could convince him of the dangers of the “May 17 Agreement.” The Syrians had no intention of defeating Amin Gemayel in Geneva; on the contrary, they wanted to appease him as much as possible and draw him into the Syrian-Saudi camp, despite their limited affection for him.
In his personal papers, Khaddam writes: “When he used to come to my office [before he became president of the republic], he would spend three hours presenting his case for the meeting. He is the president of the republic, but he is not our president.”
Khaddam quotes President Assad as having felt “pity” for Gemayel: “Amin Gemayel and his father aroused feelings of pity in us. I say that the emotional situation had an impact on our entry into Lebanon, because we could not stand by and watch people slaughtering one another when they were all our own people, and simply stand by as spectators.”
The Syrian-backed team in Geneva tried to insist in the documents on the annulment of the “May 17 Agreement,” but they failed to do so. The final communiqué merely affirmed Lebanon’s Arab identity and called for an end to the Israeli occupation. The participants were supposed to meet again on November 14, but the session was canceled because of developments inside Lebanon and the bombing of the Marines.
Some time after the Geneva dialogue ended, Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in Damascus again on September 30, 1983, accompanied by his aides Richard Murphy and Fairbanks. They raised the issue of foreign intervention in Lebanon once more, calling for a Syrian-Israeli withdrawal, even if carried out in stages, beginning with the withdrawal of the Syrians from Aley and the Chouf. Khaddam reminded them: “You forgot the American forces.” The following exchange took place:
Shultz: Our forces are there at the request of the government.
Khaddam: So are we. We are there at the request of the Lebanese government and the Arab Summit. The present government that invited you represents no more than 10 percent of Lebanon.
Shultz: They said they represent 94 percent.
Khaddam: Since they represent 94 percent, let us and Israel both leave Lebanon and see how Amin Gemayel fares. Then you will see how many hours he lasts.
Shultz: Are you prepared to agree to a timetable for withdrawal?
Khaddam: We cannot hand Lebanon over to Israel, nor can we accept an Israeli security zone 23 kilometers from our border. The agreement [the May 17 Agreement] must be annulled, and when that happens, we are ready to do whatever the Lebanese government asks. We have no ambitions in Lebanon. Our only interest is to see Lebanon remain united. If America goes to Lebanon under the protection of its own interests, despite being 10,000 kilometers away, while our capital is 25 kilometers from the Lebanese border, we are not a superpower, but we are a state with the right to survive.
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U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam in Damascus in 1983 (Khaddam became vice president in 1984).
The Attack on the Marine Barracks on the Eve of the Geneva Talks
One week before the Geneva Conference was due to convene, a truck laden with explosives rammed into the headquarters of the U.S. Marine units in Beirut, while another struck the headquarters of the French forces, causing two massive explosions at six o’clock in the morning on October 23, 1983. The attacks killed more than 250 Americans and approximately 90 French personnel. Suspicion immediately fell on armed groups operating on behalf of Iran, after a little-known faction calling itself the “Islamic Jihad Organization” formally claimed responsibility. The same faction had claimed responsibility, on April 18, 1983, for the suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which killed 17 American citizens and 32 Lebanese citizens.
Among the indications of the connections between the two wars, in 1982 and 2024, separated by four decades, is the fact that Fuad Shukr and Ibrahim Aqil, the Hezbollah commanders assassinated by Israel in recent weeks, had participated in the 1983 attack on the Marines. At the time, Hezbollah had not yet been formally established; various organizations and cells, including Islamic Jihad, were emerging in anticipation of the official announcement of the formation of the party.
Following the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the United States said that Iranian elements in Lebanon were operating “behind the Syrian lines,” that “they are allied with Syria,” and that Syria should bear part of the responsibility for any Iranian activities in Lebanon, “whether Syria knew of any particular terrorist plans or not.”
Less than two hours after the Marine barracks explosion, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger moved to accuse Iran and Syria. George Shultz, meanwhile, presented a statement before the two congressional foreign affairs committees, saying:
“Our objective is a political solution, not a military solution, in Lebanon. The presence of our Marines constituted a fundamental pillar of the stability structure needed to make a political solution possible. The primary responsibility rests with the Lebanese Armed Forces, which we have helped train and equip. They are more than a match for their Lebanese adversaries, but their difficulties stem from the fact that they are being attacked by forces protected, armed, supported, and encouraged by Syria.
“Israel is also a major factor in Lebanon, and we need its constructive efforts in supporting the Lebanese government and the process of national reconciliation. Israel has influence over some of the sectarian groups, and we hope it will use that influence to encourage a political settlement.”
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U.S. Marines conduct an evacuation operation for American, European, and other foreign civilians, who were transported by U.S. military helicopters to ships off the coast of Beirut in 1984.
As Shultz put it, Syria and its allies had “obstructed our efforts to remove the foreign forces and accelerate a political settlement.” “No one doubts Syria’s legitimate security concerns with regard to Lebanon, but unlike Israel, Syria is unwilling to negotiate with Lebanon over how to reconcile its security concerns with Lebanon’s sovereign right to determine its own future.”
Iran responded to these statements through the head of its Supreme Court, who said: “The Islamic people of Lebanon dealt with the United States and France in a manner that taught them a lesson about not attacking and assaulting oppressed peoples.” While the Syrian government condemned the bombing, the state-controlled newspapers welcomed it and wrote about what they called the “Lebanese national resistance.”
Amid the escalation with the United States, the growing size of the American force off the Lebanese coast, intensified contacts between Washington and Tel Aviv, and the Begin government’s call-up of reservists, the Syrian army command called up its reserve forces and began preparing for the possibility of a military confrontation with the Americans in Lebanon.
The Syrian ambassador in Washington was then summoned and informed that the United States “had no intention of taking hostile action against Syria,” while the Americans expressed surprise at Syria’s call for general mobilization. The U.S. State Department spokesman said: “We urge restraint, and the United States and Israel are not planning any military action in Lebanon against Syria.”
On November 12, 1983, U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli in Damascus visited Foreign Minister Khaddam and said that rocket launchers had been positioned in the outskirts of Beirut and near Aley, aimed at American ships at sea and at Beirut Airport. Some of these weapons, he said, were in the hands of the Druze, Syria’s allies [the group led by Walid Jumblatt].
“Therefore, we formally ask you to prevent such potential attacks from taking place in areas where Syrian forces are present. We attach the utmost importance to this matter, and I do not find it necessary to reiterate what the American president and Secretary Shultz have said: that we will leave no one in any doubt that we will not hesitate to protect our forces and take the necessary military measures, and that we will use every available means at our disposal to protect our interests in Lebanon.”
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Palestinian and Syrian soldiers as they leave Beirut, Lebanon, on August 27, 1982.
The Syrian side responded that Syrian forces had not been present in Beirut when the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut took place, saying: “We do not want an attack against anyone to occur, and we also do not want accusations to be recklessly thrown at one side or another.”
U.S. Ambassador Paganelli replied: “Most of the evidence indicates that the attack was carried out by the Iranians, and the blame falls on Syria because it allowed the Iranians to pass through its territory. They receive support from you, so Syria is to blame for what is happening, and this is not in Syria’s interest. It is in Syria’s interest to put a stop to these activities.”
At this point, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Issam al-Naib intervened and said: “As for blaming Syria for allowing the Iranians to pass through, I would like to ask: Can we prevent Iranians, with whose government we have good relations, from passing through our territory? And does the passage of an Iranian necessarily mean that he is going there to carry out an attack?”
U.S. Ambassador: “Yes, of course… If the Iranians are going to join a group whose aims are incompatible with ours and whose activities create a problem for America, then Syria, as a sovereign government, must take action to prevent that. The attack on the Marines was an evil terrorist act aimed at destabilizing the situation and forcing the foreign forces to leave Lebanon. If that was the objective, it has failed. The American people support President Reagan in keeping the forces in Lebanon in order to restore stability. One of the things that is generally agreed upon there is that if the forces withdraw, the situation will deteriorate considerably.”
