When I decided to write this book, I made a commitment to presenting the facts objectively and analyzing them without being swayed by emotions or effects. I asked myself a set of questions and provided answers after careful consideration. This approach is evident in the first chapter of Abdel Halim Khaddam’s political memoir, The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region, which was released a few days ago.
The controversial Syrian politician recounts events that he witnessed, participated in, or learned about, revealing how Damascus facilitated Tehran’s regional activities and helped establish alliances in volatile areas ranging from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Before delving into the details of Syrian-Iranian relations, Khaddam highlights the escalation of American interest in Iran since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The US provided significant assistance to the Shah of Iran, considering his country to be the first line of defense against Soviet expansion. Khaddam then discusses how Washington uses the Iranian nuclear issue to divert attention from major concerns that worry the West, particularly the nature of the Islamic regime.
Khaddam believes that the US and Israel are obstacles to Iran’s regional goals. He notes, however, the difficulty of America’s attempt to foment internal unrest in Iran, considering that external tensions weaken the ability of the internal opposition.
Regarding the foundations of Syrian-Iranian relations, Khaddam traces the early beginnings of the relationship between Damascus and the leaders of the Iranian revolution. He recounts how Musa Al-Sadr, the President of the Supreme Shiite Council in Lebanon, played a pivotal role in forging the relationship and how his own relationship with Iran began. Syria ultimately settled on signing a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and forming an alliance with the Islamic Republic.
Khaddam reveals the Syrian objectives of the alliance with Iran, including the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, which put Syria at war with Iraq while it was also fighting Iran. Despite the ideological differences between the secular regime in Syria and the Islamic regime in Iran, Khaddam argues that these did not impede the alliance’s consolidation, as the main issues were not in dispute.
Khaddam acknowledges that the nature of the regime in Damascus prevented Syria from having a long-term strategy, but it created an environment in which the regime could maneuver. This led Syria to contemplate fighting a war to liberate the Golan due to its inability to build a state and its institutions.
In another significant section of the memoir, Khaddam discusses the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s relationship with Lebanese politicians and his trust in them. He also explains why mostly Christian and Sunni Muslim politicians were not safe. He also recounts the story of Iran’s entry into Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of its territory in 1982 and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s tasks in the region. Khaddam describes how President Hafez al-Assad was not concerned about Iranian influence and did not consider Iran to have expansionist ambitions. He also discusses Syria’s continued support for Hezbollah.
Khaddam reveals the details of the dispute between Damascus and the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and how Iran exacerbated it. He recounts a conversation between himself and the Iranian ambassador to his country that included discussion of Ataba from Damascus to Tehran. Khaddam also questions whether it is reasonable for Hezbollah’s weight to be greater in Iran than in Syria.
In an important chapter of his memoir, Khaddam discusses Hafez al-Assad’s attempts to halt the Iran-Iraq war during its early days due to Saddam Hussein’s intransigence. Some in the Gulf had anticipated that Iraq would achieve a swift victory, which, together with other events, resulted in an imbalance in Syrian-Gulf relations, causing tensions at times.
Khaddam also reveals the personal role he played in providing assurances to the Gulf states regarding Iranian intentions towards them. He describes the content of his visit to their leaders, the atmosphere in the region, and the nature of relations between its countries. He further explains how Iraqi-Iranian reconciliation was much simpler than reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad.
In the second chapter of the memoirs of former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, “The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region”, he points out that the Middle East is facing two severe and explosive crises that threaten security and stability in the region, as well as international security and stability. He stressed that the two crises that concern the peoples of the region and most of the world are the crisis of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Khaddam wrote: “More than six decades have passed since the outbreak of the crisis. One of the first victims was the Palestinian people, more than half of whom were displaced from their homes to live in the worst conditions and the most severe suffering in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In addition, tens of thousands have sought refuge in Arab and foreign countries. The other half lives under Israeli occupation with all its brutal practices under the eyes of the international community.”
He added that after assuming the presidency of the United States, Barack Obama announced his commitment to resolving the Middle East crisis and establishing a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. However, he did not specify the basis for the solution or the reference, nor did he specify the geographical boundaries of the Palestinian state. Khaddam then raises several questions, such as how Obama plans to achieve the peace project in the region, and whether it will be through American mediation between Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arab countries.
He also asks whether Obama will have a clear vision to achieve the project, and if he will be able to persuade Israelis to dismantle settlements and withdraw from the West Bank and Jerusalem. Additionally, Khaddam wonders how Obama will address the refugee problem, which is one of the main issues in the Palestinian file, and whether he will make decisions that Israel will commit to in the event of its intransigence.
Khaddam concludes by asking whether the Palestinian Authority will accept a solution to the refugee problem by recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, conducting a population exchange between Arabs living in Israel and Israelis living in West Bank settlements, and whether they will accept less solutions than those mentioned in the Arab initiative. Finally, he questions whether Israel will accept a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and solve the refugee problem on the basis of resolution 194.
These questions determine the fate of political solutions in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the region. There is no indication that peace can be achieved because of Israeli intransigence.
In this regard, Khaddam referred to a letter sent by former American President Harry Truman to Congress in 1951, in which he presented the international reality and global policies of the United States. It included a paragraph on the Middle East, which stated that Middle Eastern countries were mostly less advanced in industry than European countries. However, the Middle East is of great importance for the peace of the free world as a whole, and this region is a vital center for land, sea, and air communications between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Middle East accounts for half of the world’s oil reserves, and the region is more exposed to Soviet pressure. Thus, the US President identified the position of the Middle East in the strategy of the United States as one of the most important areas for the security and safety of the West and ensuring its interests. Within the framework of this vision, Iran has had an important position in the Western world. It is a large oil country located on the borders of Arab oil countries. Its borders extend from Pakistan to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Iraq. It overlooks the Gulf. Khaddam continued, “The United States focused special attention on Iran after the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviets. It provided great assistance to the Shah of Iran, considering that this country is the first line in the face of Soviet expansion in the oil areas in the Gulf and Iraq.” He stressed that the concern of the West was not due to the fall of the Shah. Several pro-Western regimes fell, but it did not have a deep resonance with the United States and its allies. However, the situation in Iran is different from any other country. It is a large oil country overlooking the Gulf, which is a red zone for the United States and its allies. Khaddam moves to a new focus on the Iranian nuclear issue. He asks, “Is it really the focus of the severe crisis between the United States and Iran? If Iran agrees to the requirements of the Agency for Nuclear Energy, will the crisis end and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic become normal relations?” Before pointing out that India, Pakistan, and Israel have nuclear weapons, why focus on Iran and not on these three countries? He answers that the nuclear file is important as a cover for major issues that concern and fear the West, especially the United States. According to the book, it is the nature of the Islamic regime that exists in Iran, a major oil country located on the border of the largest oil reserves in the world. He believes that the dispute between the United States and Iran did not start because of the American hostage-taking in the American Embassy after the success of the Islamic Revolution. Rather, it started at the moment when the Shah’s regime collapsed, Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran, and launched a harsh campaign against the United States, calling it the Great Satan.
Khaddam identifies the American goals towards Iran. The first one is to overthrow the Islamic Republic and establish a secular regime that is friendly to the United States as a guarantee of its economic, security, and political interests in the region. If the existing regime in Iran cannot be overthrown, the United States will work with all means of pressure to change the nature of the regime by altering its behavior so that the Islamic Republic becomes a stagnant state that is preoccupied with its internal problems.
This strategy, according to Khaddam, requires pressure on Iran to accept the following demands:
- Retreat beyond its national borders and not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, thus retracting from its ambitions to become a leading major country in the region.
- Break its ties with its regional allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Gulf states. It should also stop activities in other countries, including stopping campaigns against Israel and living with it, as some Arab countries have done as a prelude to establishing peace with it.
- Halt the development of its armed forces and abandon weapons of mass destruction.
- Place its nuclear program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Expand the circle of public and individual freedoms, including developing the political system in a way that eliminates the role of Wali al-Faqih and religious authorities, obliging them to recognize the rights of minorities that make up the Iranian nation.
In order to meet these demands, the United States and its allies are expected to provide a package of incentives, including economic assistance to address the economic situation in Iran, the formation of a regional system of security and economic cooperation in which Iran is a member along with the Arab countries, Turkey, and Israel, and ending the file of frozen Iranian funds in the United States.
In Khaddam’s opinion, the United States and Israel are two obstacles to Iran’s achievement of its regional goals. He points out that the foundations of Iranian policy in the region and in any dialogue with the West and the United States revolve around the following points:
- Ending the American military presence in the region and in Afghanistan.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the region.
- Recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to build their state and the right of return for refugees.
- Forming a security system of Iran, Turkey, and the Arab countries in the region to ensure the security and stability of the region.
- Recognizing Iran as a leading country in the region and enabling it to participate in all issues related to international security and global economic issues.
- Recognizing Iran’s right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with a pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons, as part of a solution to the problem of weapons of mass destruction in the world, including nuclear weapons.
He asserts that in the current situation, the parties have not reached solutions not only on the Iranian nuclear issue but also on all issues related to Iran’s regional strategy. He asks: With the decline in the issue of military action, is the United States betting on the internal situation in Iran, especially after the discovery of gaps in those conditions following the Iranian presidential elections? Will the United States and its allies resort to a series of economic, security, and political decisions and measures to blockade Iran in the hope of bringing it down from within? In this case, will Iran resort to breaking the siege by escalating tensions in the Gulf and in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine? Will this develop into a war or a series of wars in the region?
He answers that betting on the internal situation in Iran is a difficult bet to achieve, as external tensions will weaken the ability of the internal opposition and lead to more rigidity and inflexibility of the Iranian leadership. The big question, as described by the former Vice President of Syria, is whether war will be the solution to the conflict between the United States and its allies on the one hand and Iran on the other hand. Will this lead to major regional and international changes? Will the United States remain the dominant country?
Khaddam concludes this chapter by saying: It is clear that in light of the current data, the region will remain under the pressure of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand and the conflict between the United States and its allies and Iran on the other. In any case, the Middle East region will remain a zone of anxiety, fear, and insecurity and will not regain its balance in the absence of an Arab system that guarantees the interests, sovereignty, and rights of Arabs. This system is a balancing factor between international and regional powers.
He ends by stating that what is dangerous in all these situations is the absence of Arabs on whose land the conflict is taking place at the expense of their security, stability, and future.
