The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Founding of Hezbollah
How did Assad, who was present in Lebanon and preoccupied with his conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Khomeini, who was engaged in the war with Saddam, think?
After the Camp David Accords in the late 1970s, Assad and Saddam sought to strengthen their relationship, but the attempt failed when Saddam came to power, and his calculations changed with Khomeini’s rise to power in February 1979.
To put things into context, talks between Assad and Saddam were ongoing, as the Syrian president had dispatched Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam to Baghdad to meet Saddam. They met in early January 1979, just days before Khomeini’s revolution against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. According to an official Syrian record of the meeting, Imam Ruhollah Khomeini was seeking to return to the region to be close to his country when the Shah fell. Khaddam said that Khomeini, who was residing in France at the time, had sent a message to President Assad, requesting to reside in Syria. However, Assad declined and promised to try to arrange for him to stay in Algeria. Saddam responded that although Iraq supported the “revolution,” it did not want to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. Khaddam replied that the Syrian leadership wished to maintain direct communication with Khomeini “as a precaution for the future” in order to leverage it in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Saddam, who would go to war with Khomeini just a year later, responded, “There is no objection to keeping these lines open with him, but without his presence on Syrian soil.” Saddam justified his decision by expressing his fear that the communists might seize power in Tehran, and that only the religious movement could stand against them.
Saddam’s calculations proved to be wrong, as became evident the following month. On the other hand, Assad benefited from the victory of the “revolution” in Iran in 1979. There were Iranian figures opposed to the Shah who were based in Lebanon, and they soon assumed power in Tehran. The Syrian authorities in Lebanon had, for years, supported the Amal Movement and leaders of the “Iran Liberation Movement,” who lived in Lebanon and regarded the head of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, Musa al-Sadr, as their religious authority. Many of these figures later took on key roles after Khomeini’s revolution, including Iran’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, his deputy Sadeq Tabatabaei (al-Sadr’s nephew), Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi (who succeeded Bazargan after his resignation), Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Mostafa Chamran, who later became Minister of Defense.
Assad, who had refused to host Khomeini after he was expelled from Iraq to avoid upsetting Saddam, promptly sent a “warm congratulations” message to Khomeini after the success of his “revolution,” expressing his commitment to “comprehensive cooperation.” He then dispatched Khaddam to Iran in early August, where Khaddam met Bazargan, the prime minister, and other senior officials, who affirmed that the “revolution will work to build strong relations with sister Syria.”
The most important part of the visit was Khaddam’s meeting with Khomeini in Qom, where Khomeini spoke briefly, “asked me to convey his thanks to President Assad, his greetings to him, and his desire for strong relations with Syria.” Khaddam commented, “The meeting was short and symbolic, but it was of great significance, as I sensed the determination in every word Khomeini uttered.” He added, “After returning to Damascus, I presented the details of the visit to Hafez, and we found that the conditions were ripe for cooperation with the new regime in Iran.”
Indeed, that is what happened. An alliance was built, which became a cornerstone of Middle Eastern politics, with one of its main tools being the founding of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The green light for this was given by Iranian figures who had been opposition members living in Lebanon and soon became decision-makers after the “Khomeini revolution.”
Iran’s Wider Entry into Lebanon during the Israeli Invasion of 1982
Iran’s more significant and active involvement in Lebanon occurred during the Israeli invasion of Lebanese territory in early June 1982. At that time, the Iranian leadership decided to send a brigade and experts from the “Revolutionary Guard” to Syria, which had deployed its forces into Lebanon in 1976. Indeed, the Iranian “Guard” brigade arrived a few days after the fighting began, with most of its forces heading to Lebanon, specifically to Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in the Baalbek-Hermel region.
This group began the process of founding Hezbollah, and the “Dawa Party” was one of the first groups that contributed to its establishment. During this phase, the Revolutionary Guard focused on organization, ideological and political preparation, training, and the careful selection of members to avoid any infiltration. Hezbollah concentrated on resistance, avoiding involvement in Lebanon’s internal affairs.
Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam writes in his memoirs: “A group from the brigade coming from Iran went to the Baalbek-Hermel area in Lebanon. It did not participate in the war, which ended after the ceasefire decision, but it did something more important than that.” He notes that the Revolutionary Guard group focused on:
- A: Organization, ideological and political preparation, training, and careful selection of members to avoid any infiltrations.
- B: The firm approach was for Hezbollah to focus on resistance and not be drawn into Lebanese internal affairs, thus concentrating on preparation, training, and carrying out targeted operations against the Israeli occupying forces.
- C: Strong emphasis on personal conduct and avoiding the practices of other armed groups in the Lebanese arena.
- D: Expanding the party’s development and the process of military and ideological training, along with gaining the sympathy of citizens in southern Lebanon.
- E: Iran provided Hezbollah with military assistance in terms of training, preparation, arming, and funding, as well as support for some social services. Hezbollah established institutions that played a significant role in winning over the Shiite Muslim community in Lebanon. Iran also utilized its relationship with Syria to build and support Hezbollah.
Syria’s overall stance was practically more sympathetic to the Amal Movement, with Assad alone showing support for Hezbollah and directing the army and security agencies to assist it, according to Khaddam. He adds: “The president based his position on the fact that Hezbollah had become the main force of resistance after the decline of Amal and the nationalist parties. Therefore, reliance on it was necessary to resist and exhaust Israel. On the other hand, most of the Syrian officers in Lebanon sympathized with Amal and were not inclined toward Hezbollah, viewing it as an Islamic party. These Syrian officers were still under the shadow of the bloody events that had occurred in Syria between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Khaddam believes that Assad was not worried about Iranian influence, nor did he think that Iran was building a military and political base in Lebanon to serve its strategy or that it had ambitions for regional expansion. Instead, he saw Iran as an ally in the confrontation against the Iraqi regime.
In return, under the Syrian umbrella, Iran provided Hezbollah with military aid, training, preparation, armaments, and funding for social services.
One of the rare instances of confrontation between the Syrian army and Hezbollah occurred in February 1987, when more than twenty Hezbollah members were killed at the Fathallah Barracks in Beirut. This happened after Assad decided to impose security in the capital, based on the request of Lebanese forces. Notably, the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Hassan Akhtari, requested a meeting with Khaddam on March 3 to protest the incident. According to the meeting minutes, Khaddam criticized Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi’s statement that “anyone who lays a hand on Hezbollah serves Israel and America” and that “some figures in Iran equate Syria with Hezbollah.”
Khaddam said, “When Hezbollah was founded, we considered it a friendly party and provided it with assistance and support. We tolerated all the negative actions taken by some of its members against Syria’s friends in Lebanon and against Syrian soldiers, and we did not react.” He continued, “But you may recall that we have warned several times about infiltrations within this organization by three groups: Arafat’s people, Iraqi elements, and the Lebanese Second Bureau. We warned of the dangers of these infiltrations because we feared that these groups, which had penetrated Hezbollah, would carry out actions that would harm its role in Lebanon and its relations with Syria. Unfortunately, these warnings were not given the necessary attention by Hezbollah’s leadership.”
Khaddam then asked the ambassador, “Is Imad Mughniyeh part of Hezbollah or not?” Akhtari replied, “I have not met him, and I don’t know him. According to my information, he is not part of the formations, and he is not part of Hezbollah.” He added, “Regarding your point about an infiltration in Hezbollah, I do not deny that. Arafat may be able to infiltrate some individuals, but if we look at Hezbollah and its declared goals, it cannot align with Arafat.” Khaddam responded, “I distinguished between Hezbollah as a leadership and certain individuals.”
